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"GAY RIGHTS" FOR "GAY WHITES"?:
RACE, SEXUAL IDENTITY, AND
EQUAL PROTECTION DISCOURSE
Darren Lenard Hutchinsont
INTRODUCTION
The issue of gay and lesbian legal "equality" remains unresolved
and highly contested.' Despite the vigorous efforts of gay and lesbian
activists and theorists and the recent, apparent broadening of public
support for protecting gays and lesbians in formal civil rights struc-
tures,2 the legal status of gay, lesbian, bisexual, and transgendered in-
dividuals remains largely unequal and unprotected. For instance, no
federal court of appeals has applied heightened scrutiny when hear-
t Assistant Professor of Law, Southern Methodist University. BA., 1990, University of
Pennsylvania; J.D., 1993, Yale Law School. I have had several opportunities to present ear-
lier versions of this Article, and I am grateful for the helpful comments I received at these
forums. Specifically, this Article benefitted from comments received at faculty workshops
at Colorado, Southern Methodist, Stanford, and Villanova Law Schools, and from presenta-
tions at the 1999 Queer Ethnic Studies Conference at the University of California at Berke-
ley, the 1999 Latino and Latina Critical Legal Theory Conference, a 1999 DePaul Law
School antisubordination conference, and the 1999 Law and Society Annual Meeting. I
am particularly indebted to Martha Fineman for inviting me to present a draft at the 1999
Feminism and Legal Theory Workshop at Cornell Law School. The following individuals
provided stimulating comments at these forums or otherwise: Michelle Anderson, Elvia
Arriola, Paul Brest, William Bridge, Jennifer Gerrarda Brown, Harlon L. Dalton, David
Cruz, Richard Ford, Katherine Franke, Clark Freshman, Jeffrey Gaba, Isabelle Gunning,
Pamela Karlan, George Martinez, Teemu Ruskola, Daniel Shuman, Terry Smith, and Rich-
ard C. Turkington. I apologize to any persons whose input I have neglected to acknowl-
edge. Barbara Nicholas, Michael Smith, and Darlene Woodson provided excellent
research assistance. Southern Methodist University provided financial assistance for this
project.
1 See generally EVAN GERSTMANN, THE CONSITUTIONAL UNDERcLAss: GAYs, LEsBIANS,
AND THE FAILURE OF CLAss-BASED EQUAL PRoTEanoN 3-39 (1999) (analyzing the
subordinate status of gays and lesbians within equal protection doctrine). By "equality" I
refer to the inclusion of gays, lesbians, bisexuals, and transgendered individuals in antidis-
crimination law and policy at the state and federal level. I do not, however, limit the term
equality simply to notions of formal equality, which is the focus of much antidiscrirnination
doctrine. Instead, I view the question of equality as a substantive and formal issue.
2 See Lisa M. Farabee, Note, Marriage, Equal Protection, and New Judicial Federalism: A
View from the States, 14 YALE L. & POL'Y R-v. 237, 270 (1996) ("Public opinion has ...
become more supportive of gay rights in general."); see also id. at 270 n.174 (citing to
various polling data indicating increasing public support of gay and lesbian equality). The
public, however, is selective about which dimensions of "gay rights" agendas it supports.
See William A. Henry, III, Pride and Prejudice, TxssE, June 27, 1994, at 54, 58 (indicating
broad public support for antidiscrimination laws protecting gays and lesbians against job
discrimination but wide public opposition to efforts to legalize same-sex marriage).
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ing sexual orientation-based equal protection claims.3 The first time
the Supreme Court reviewed an equal protection claim brought by
gays, lesbians, and bisexuals, it avoided deciding the applicability of
heightened scrutiny.4 The extensive network of federal antidis-
crimination laws does not prohibit discrimination on the basis of sex-
ual orientation.5  Finally, while several states6  and numerous
municipalities7 have enacted legislation prohibiting private and gov-
ernmental discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation, such dis-
crimination remains permissible in the vast majority of jurisdictions,
and civil rights laws that extend coverage to gays and lesbians have
faced significant, and successful, political challenges.8
While the resolution of the problem of gay and lesbian inequality
will ultimately turn on a host of social, legal, political, and ideological
variables, this Article argues that the success or failure of efforts to
achieve legal equality for gays, lesbians, bisexuals, and transgendered
individuals will depend in large part on how scholars and activists in
this field address questions of racial identity and racial subjugation.
3 See GERSTMANN, supra note 1, at 60 ("The appellate courts have consistently rejected
the argument that gays and lesbians are a suspect class.... Every court that has considered
the issue has stated that gays and lesbians simply do not meet the criteria for a suspect
class."). The Ninth Circuit, in a divided opinion, once held that gays and lesbians consti-
tuted a "suspect" class, but that opinion was withdrawn. See Watkins v. United States Army,
847 F.2d 1329, 1349 (9th Cir. 1988), withdrawn, 875 F.2d 699, 711 (9th Cir. 1989), cert.
denied, 498 U.S. 957 (1990).
4 See Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 632 (1996) (holding that a Colorado constitu-
tional amendment that banned state and municipal laws prohibiting discrimination based
on sexual orientation lacked a "rational basis").
5 See Francisco Valdes, Queer Margins, QueerEthics: A Call to Account for Race and Ethnic-
ity in the Law, Theory, and Politics of "Sexual Orientation," 48 HAsrrNrs LJ. 1293, 1335 (1997)
(noting that "'sexual orientation discrimination' is not formally prohibited by federal anti-
discrimination statutes").
6 The following states prohibit discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation: Cali-
fornia, Connecticut, the District of Columbia, Hawaii, Massachusetts, Minnesota, New
Hampshire, New Jersey, Rhode Island, Vermont, and Wisconsin. See CAL. LAB. CODE
§§ 1101, 1102 (West 1999); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46a-81c (West 1999); D.C. CODE ANN.
§ 1-2512 (1999); HAw. REv. STAT. ANN. § 368-1 (Michie 1999); MAss. GEN. LAws ANN. ch.
151B, § 4 (West 1999); MiNN. STAT. ANN. § 363.12(1), (2) (West 1999); N.H. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 354-A:6-8 (1999); NJ. STAT. ANN. § 10:5-12 (West 1999); RI. GEN. LAws § 28-5-7
(1999); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 495 (1999); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 111.31, 111.36 (West 1999).
7 See, e.g., Lambda Legal Defense and Education Fund, Summary of State, Cities, and
Counties Which Prohibit Discrimination Based on Sexual Orientation (visited Mar. 8, 2000)
<http://www.lambdalegal.org/cgi-bin/pages/states/antidiscri-map> (listing city and
county antidiscrimination ordinances).
8 See, e.g., Romer, 517 U.S. at 632 (invalidating statewide proscription of laws protect-
ing gays and lesbians from discrimination); see also Equality Found. of Greater Cincinnati,
Inc. v. Cincinnati, 128 F.3d 289, 301 (6th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 943 (1998) (up-
holding municipal ban on laws protecting gays and lesbians from discrimination, despite
Romer decision); Carey Goldberg, Maine Voters Repeal a Law on Gay Rights, N.Y. TNiErs, Feb.
12, 1998, at Al (reporting voter repeal of Maine law that banned discrimination on the
basis of sexual orientation in housing, employment, credit, and places of public
accommodation).
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Commonly, these scholars and activists currently discuss race by use of
analogies between 'racial discrimination" and "sexual orientation dis-
crimination," or between "people of color" and "gays and lesbians."
On one level, the "comparative approach" to race and sexuality may
have some validity because it can create empathy with the oppression
experienced by gays and lesbians. It also might help link the question
of gay rights to existing equal protection precedent and civil rights
laws that emerged from a context of racial subjugation and resist-
ance.9 Ultimately, however, this approach impedes the quest for gay
and lesbian equality.10
Specifically, the comparative approach marginalizes (or treats as
nonexistent) gays and lesbians of color, leading to a narrow construc-
tion of the gay and lesbian community as largely upper-class and
white." Such a comparative discussion of race and sexuality in pro-
gay and lesbian discourse reflects a broader marginalization of per-
sons of color (and women and the poor) who are excluded from es-
sentialist queer theories and politics.12 Opponents of gay and lesbian
9 See, e.g., Janet E. Halley, Gay Rights and Identity Imitation: Issues in the Ethics of Rpre-
sentation, in THx PoLrIcs OF LAw: A PROGRESSIVE CRmQUE 115, 121 (David Kairys ed.,
1998). Professor Halley notes that
seeking to find room under the aegis of these key equality precedents, gay
and lesbian advocates often find themselves saying that sexual orientation is
like race, or that gay men and lesbians are like a racial group, or that anti-
gay policies are like racist policies, or that homophobia is like racism.
Id. Professor Rush argues that
equal protection analysis revolves around comparing different types of dis-
crimination to race or sex discrimination. At present, then, advocates for
gay men and lesbians who attempt to secure heightened scrutiny for sexual
orientation discrimination cases are pursuing both possibilities of compar-
ing sexual orientation to sex and race.
Sharon Elizabeth Rush, Equal Protection Analogies-Identity and "Passing: Race and Sexual Ori-
entation, 13 HARv. BLAcKLmrrERJ. 65, 76 (1997).
10 See Darren Lenard Hutchinson, Out Yet Unseen: A Racial Critique of Gay and Lesbian
Legal Theory and Political Discours 29 CONN. L. Rav. 561, 624-34 (1997) [hereinafter Hutch-
inson, Out Yet UnseenJ (discussing problems that arise from comparisons of "race" and
"sexual orientation"); see also Darren Lenard Hutchinson, Ignoring the Sexualization of Race:
Heteronormativiy, Critical Race Theory and Anti-Racist Politics, 47 BuFF. L. Rav. 1, 40-44 (1999)
[hereinafter Hutchinson, Ignoring the Sexualization of Race] (same); Jane S. Schacter, The
Gay Civil Rights Debate in the States: Decoding the Discourse of Equivalents, 29 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L.
Ray. 283, 315 (1994) (arguing that race-sexuality analogies neither serve "the cause of gay
civil rights, nor of civil rights in general").
11 See Hutchinson, Ignoring the Sexualization of Race, supra note 10, at 42 (arguing that
"comparisons between oppressed groups" incorrectly "treat their subject populations as
mutually exclusive groups, thus erasing the experiences and compounding the invisibility
of persons with multiple subordinated statuses"); see also Mary Eaton, Homosexual Unmodi-
fied: Speculation on Law s Discourse, Race, and the Construction of Sexual Identity, in LEGAL INVER-
SIONS: LEsBIANS, GAY MEN AND Tm PoIcs OF LAW 46, 62 (Didi Herman & Carl Stychin
eds., 1995) ("'Black homosexual' is... an oxymoron in an analogical comparison of blacks
and homosexuals.").
12 See generally Hutchinson, Out Yet Unseen, supra note 10, at 563-64 n.12 (citing nu-
merous sources on gay, lesbian, bisexual, transgender of color subjectivity).
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equality employ a similarly narrow construction of the gay and lesbian
community in political discourse and judicial opinions; scholars, activ-
ists, and jurists contest the "morality" and necessity of extending civil
rights protections to gay and lesbian citizens by depicting the gay and
lesbian community as largely white, privileged, and unharmed by any
discrimination they face. 13 In addition, antiracist theorists, whether
avowedly heterosexist or not, help perpetuate a white-normative por-
trait of gay, lesbian, bisexual, and transgendered identity. These theo-
rists invariably fail to examine the racial effects of heterosexism on
people of color; they exclude gays, lesbians, bisexuals, and trans-
gendered individuals from antiracist discourse; and they often view
the inclusion of progressive gay and lesbian politics within civil rights
theory as a threat to antiracism and of secondary importance to racial
justice. 14
Thus, pro- and anti-gay discourses and antiracist theory collec-
tively contribute to a white-normative construction of gay, lesbian, bi-
sexual, and transgendered identity-a narrow, racialized construct
that hinders gay and lesbian equality efforts. In order to counter this
harmful trend, law and sexuality scholars should adopt a multidimen-
sional lens to analyze sexual subordination claims and to portray gay
and lesbian experience. A multidimensional analysis of heterosexism
and homophobia-one that examines the various racial, class, gender,
and other dimensions of gay, lesbian, bisexual, and transgendered
identity and the diverse effects of heterosexism-can destabilize the
"gay as white and privileged" stereotype and offer a more productive
approach to secure gay and lesbian equality.
My argument proceeds in four parts. Part I situates my discussion
of the synergistic relationship among race, class, gender, and sexuality
within a broader body of research on the "intersectionality" of systems
of oppression and of identity categories. Part I then examines how my
scholarship attempts to advance this literature both substantively and
conceptually. Part II expounds my claim that the comparative and
essentialist treatment of race and sexuality within pro-gay and lesbian
theory and politics marginalizes gay, lesbian, bisexual, and trans-
gendered persons of color and constructs and reinforces the notion
that the gay and lesbian community is uniformly white and privileged.
Part II then examines how anti-gay theorists and activists deploy the
"gay as white and privileged" stereotype in their arguments that gays
and lesbians, as a privileged class, do not merit the protection of ex-
isting equality frameworks. Part II concludes by discussing how an-
tiracist discourse contributes to the harmful white-normative
construction of gays and lesbians through its heteronormative assump-
13 See Hutchinson, Ignoring the Sexualization of Race, supra note 10, at 69-74.
14 See id. at 7.
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dons about both racial subordination and people of color. Part III
analyzes the emergence of the white-normative construction of gays
and lesbians in equal protection doctrine. Part III then argues that
jurists invoke this stereotype to justify their refusal to apply height-
ened scrutiny to claims of discrimination brought by gay, lesbian, bi-
sexual, and transgendered individuals. Part IV proposes a
multidimensional framework for analyzing race within gay and lesbian
equality discourse that more accurately depicts the injuries of anti-gay
and lesbian discrimination and that refutes the "gay as white and privi-
leged" stereotype. It is my hope that a multidimensional approach to
the question of gay and lesbian equality-one that treats race, class,
and gender as integral components of gay, lesbian, bisexual, and
transgendered identities and experiences-will lead to stronger legal
protection of gays and lesbians from discrimination and
subordination.
I
"INTERSEcrIONAUTY," "MULTIDIMENSIONAIT," AND THE
COMPLEXIY OF SUBORDINATION
My scholarship on the relationship between race, sexuality, class,
and gender 5 arises out of an impressive body of literature in femi-
nism and critical race theory. This scholarship has criticized feminist
and antiracist theorists, courts, and policymakers for their failure to
recognize the "intersectionality" of patriarchy and racial oppression
and for proposing theories and policies that do not provide for the
often unique ways in which women of color experience subordina-
tion.16 Intersectionality critics have persuasively counseled against ef-
forts to analyze systems of oppression as isolated phenomena 7 and
15 See Darren Lenard Hutchinson, Beyond the Rhetoric of Dirty Laundry: Examining the
Value of Internal Criticism Within Progressive Social Movements and Oppressed Communities, 5
MiCH. J. RACE & L. 185 (2000) [hereinafter Hutchinson, Dirty Laundry]; Darren Lenard
Hutchinson, "Claiming" and "Speaking" Who We Are: Black Gays and Lesbians, Racial Politics,
and the Million Man March, in BLACK MEN ON RACE, GENDER, AND SExuAL. A CRITICAL
READER 28, 28-31 (Devon W. Carbado ed., 1999); Hutchinson, Ignoring the Sexualization of
Race, supra note 10, at 6; Hutchinson, Out Yet Unseen, supra note 10, at 563-64 nn.12-13.
16 See, e.g., Paulette M. Caldwell, A Hair Piece: Perspectives on the Intersection of Race and
Gender, 1991 DuKE LJ. 365, 371-76; Kimberlh Williams Crenshaw, Mapping the Margins: In-
tersectionality, Identity Politics, and Vzolence Against Women of Color, 43 STAN. L. Rnv. 1241, 1242
(1991); Trina Grillo & Stephanie M. Wildman, Obscuring the Importance of Race: The Implica-
tion of Making Comparisons Between Racism and Sexism (Or Other -Isms), 1991 DuKE LJ. 397,
401-10; Mar J. Matsuda, Beside My Sister, Facing the Enemy: Legal Theory out of Coalition, 43
STAN. L. Rxv. 1183, 1184 (1991). For a compilation of literature on this subject, see CRnm-
CAL RACE FEMInaSM: A READER (Adrien Katherine Wing ed., 1997).
17 See, e.g., Nancy Levit, Feminism for Men: Legal Ideology and the Construction of Maleness,
43 UCIA L. REv. 1037, 1090 (1996) ("It is crucial to recognize that various forms of op-
pression ... are intertwined. Oppressions of gender intersect with other oppressions, in-
cluding those of race, sexuality, class, and ethnicity."); Matsuda, supra note 16, at 1189 ("As
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have revealed the ways in which antisubordination theories and poli-
cies typically draw on the life experiences of classes of individuals who,
though victims of oppression, occupy a relatively "privileged" space
within critical discourse and politics.' Focusing exclusively on the ex-
clusion of women of color from antiracist and feminist discourse, the
intersectionality scholars have vigorously unveiled and challenged the
privileged status of men of color and white women in progressive the-
ory and civil rights jurisprudence. 19
While the theory of intersectionality has greatly influenced my
own scholarship on subordination, I have sought to expand and de-
velop this literature in order to overcome some of its substantive and
conceptual limitations.20 My work makes a substantive contribution to
the intersectionality literature because intersectionality theorists have
generally failed to examine the relationship between heterosexism
and other forms of oppression, such as racial subordination.2 1 In-
stead, intersectionality has addressed primarily, if not exclusively, the
synergistic relationship between patriarchy and racial subordination.22
Nevertheless, an embryonic intellectual and artistic movement that ex-
plores the relationship among heterosexism, gender hierarchy, and
racial subjugation has emerged largely among artists, scholars, and ac-
tivists outside the legal community.2 3 Unquestionably, the movement
is a highly relevant extension of intersectionality; unfortunately its ex-
tralegal character renders it insufficient as a normative position about
how the fusion of racism and heterosexism should affect legal theory
and policy. By examining the relationships among class, race, gender,
and sexual hierarchies and the impact of these relationships on law
we look at... patterns of oppression, we may come to learn, finally and most importantly,
that all forms of subordination are interlocking and mutually reinforcing.").
18 See, e.g., Katherine T. Bartlett, Feminist Legal Methods, 103 -Ruv. L. REv. 829, 874
(1990) ("A theory that purports to isolate gender as a basis for oppression ... reinforces
other forms of oppression."); Grillo & Wildman, supra note 16, at 401 (arguing that femi-
nist theory "perpetuates patterns of racial domination" by, among other things, centraliz-
ing "white issues" and "rendering women of color invisible").
19 See Crenshaw, supra note 16, at 1252 ("[R]acism as experienced by people of color
who are of a particular gender-male-tends to determine the parameters of antiracists
strategies, just as sexism as experienced by women who are of a particular race-white-
tends to ground the women's movement.").
20 See Hutchinson, Ignoring the Sexualization of Race, supra note 10, at 9-17 (discussing
differences and similarities between multidimensionality and intersectionality); Hutchin-
son, Out Yet Unseen, supra note 10, at 640-41 ("[M]ultidimensionality is not a wholly alterna-
tive paradigm. Rather it can be seen as drawing upon, extending, and developing
intersectionality... [through] a 'more multidimensional' understanding of social identity
categories and subordination.").
21 See Hutchinson, Ignoring the Sexualization of Race, supra note 10, at 11-12.
22 See id. at 3 & n.9 (citing and discussing intersectionality literature focusing on patri-
archy and racial hierarchy).
23 For an extensive compilation of these works, see Hutchinson, Out Yet Unseen, supra
note 10, at 562-63 n.9.
20001 1363
CORNELL LAW REVIEW
and legal theories, my work has sought to push antisubordination the-
ory and politics beyond the substantive limitations of both the race-
gender intersectionality scholarship and the nonlegal race-sexuality
literature.24
My scholarship also marks a conceptual expansion of intersection-
ality because it analyzes multidimensional subordination as a universal
concept; as such, multidimensionality is not limited to particular
classes of oppressed individuals who are currently excluded from or
marginalized by equality discourse.2 5 In constrast, traditional intersec-
tionality scholarship suggests that the phenomenon of complex subor-
dination is unique to certain discrete groups, particularly women of
color, who suffer "intersecting" oppressions. 26 Accordingly, intersec-
tionality theorists have almost invariably refrained from critically en-
gaging the complex experiences of individuals who experience
intersecting privilege and subordination (e.g., heterosexual men of
color, wealthy white women). 27
The historical and social context in which interesectionality
emerged explains, in part, its emphasis on the "multidimensional" ex-
periences of women of color.2 8 The intersectionality paradigm devel-
oped as a response to an absence of theoretical or doctrinal
approaches to the multilayered and particularized subordination en-
dured by women of color.2 9 Thus, this early work on the complexity
of oppression made vital contributions to both the substantive and
24 See Hutchinson, Ignoring the Sexualization of Race, supra note 10, at 11-12.
25 See id. at 12-16.
26 See, e.g., id. at 12 n.37 (discussing the views of several intersectionality theorists).
27 Some intersectionality theorists have acknowledged that white women and men of
color have "intersectional" experiences. See, e.g., Grenshaw, supra note 16, at 1252 (arguing
that the "specific raced and gendered experiences [of white women and men of color],
although intersectional, often define as well as confine the interests of the entire group");
Angela P. Harris, Race and Essentialism in Feminist Legal Theory, 42 STAN. L. Rxv. 581, 608
(1990) ("This sense of a multiplicitous self is not unique to black women, but black women
have expressed this sense in ways that are striking, poignant, and potentially useful to femi-
nist theory."). The intersectionality literature, nonetheless, has not significantly unveiled
or engaged these complex experiences. Nor has this scholarship explored the significance
of universal complex subordination. See Hutchinson, Ignoring the Sexualization of Race, supra
note 10, at 12 ("The idea that 'intersecting' systems of oppression only affect limited cate-
gories of individuals is implied by statements in several writings in the race and gender line
of analysis."); Peter Kwan, Jeffrey Dahmer and the Cosynthesis of Categories, 48 HASTmGs LJ.
1257, 1275 (1997) ("[S]traight white maleness arguably is a multiple identity, but intersec-
tionality theorists would resist the claim by straight white males that theirs is an intersec-
tional subjectivity."). Thus, much of the literature subtly equates gender with "female"
status and race with "person of color" status.
28 See Hutchinson, Ignoring the Sexualization of Race, supra note 10, at 14.
29 See id.
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conceptual aspects of antisubordination theory and (subsequently)
doctrine.3 0
Despite the sociological and historical impetus behind the inter-
sectionality movement, its conceptual limitations may restrict its in-
strumental value by permitting scholars who are skeptical or
unappreciative of the complexity of subordination and identity to
question the very need to create a de-essentialized equality jurispru-
dence.3 ' For example, several white gay male commentators have ex-
plicitly rejected arguments that sexuality theorists and activists should
explore the feminist and antiracist implications of heterosexist subor-
dination and have actively resisted entreaties to form coalitions with
racial and feminist civil rights groups.3 2 Some prominent critics of
intersectionality and related theories contend that such efforts are
"wasteful"33 and that they "Balkanize"34 and hobble3 5 "gay rights" the-
ory and activism. Yet, if complex subordination only implicates the
lives of individuals burdened by intersecting subordination (as the in-
tersectionality paradigm suggests), then these claims evince a lim-
ited-yet troubling-logic. Under this rationale, the formation of a
multifaceted sexual politics, one attuned to the racial and gender
dimensions of heterosexist structures, might indeed seem wasteful to
individuals who do not personally experience intersectional
subordination. 36
Theorizing multilayered subordination and identity as universal
phenomena, however, allows for a more nuanced examination of
identity and oppression and pushes advocates of essentialized politics
and theory into a precarious position.37 For example, my recent anal-
ysis of the role of sexuality in the legal and social marginalization of
heterosexuals of color (by means as diverse as lynching and immigra-
tion policy) and the antiracist response to such "sexualized racism"
challenges the discounting of progressive gay and lesbian concerns
30 See generally id. at 14 (recognizing that "by centering their analyses on women of
color, the intersectionality scholars filled (and continue to fill) a tremendous void in civil
rights jurisprudence").
31 See id. at 14-15.
32 See id. at 15; Hutchinson, Out Yet Unseen, supra note 10, at 620-22.
33 RICHARD D. MOHR, GAYs/Jus'ncE: A STUDY OF ETHICS, SOCIETY, AND LAw 328 (1988)
(arguing that efforts to integrate feminist and andracist politics within gay rights agendas
"will not work and [are] not necessary and so [are] a wasteful drain on the movement").
34 BRUCE BAWER, A PLACE AT THE TABLE: THE GAY INDIVIDUAL IN AMRcAN SociETY 37
(1993) (describing creation of a "queer people of color media production company" and
the publication of an "anthology of lesbian, gay & bisexual Asian/Pacific American writers"
as "constricting" and as "Balkanization" (internal quotation marks omitted)).
35 See MARSHALL KIRK & HUNTER MADSEN, AFTER THE BALL: How AmRCA WILL CON-
QUER ITS FEAR AND HATRED OF GAYS IN THE '90s at 180 (1989) (characterizing feminist,
poverty and antiracist concerns as "superfluous" to gay and lesbian liberation).
36 See Hutchinson, Ignoring the Sexualization of Race, supra note 10, at 15.
37 See id. at 17.
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within contemporary antiracist discourse. 3s If antiracist theorists and
activists can vigorously respond to racism in its heterosexual forms,
then they can also actively challenge the sexualized oppression of gay,
lesbian, bisexual, and transgendered people of color and can embrace
progressive gay and lesbian political theories and activism.3 9 Similarly,
by considering how "whiteness" and "maleness" inform gay, lesbian,
bisexual, and transgender studies, my work attempts to unveil the in-
consistent arguments of gay and lesbian theorists who reject antiracist
and feminist analyses yet readily articulate theories reflective of white
gay male experience. 40 Thus, my theory of multidimensionality,
which argues that complex subordination is a universal concept, un-
covers the inherent fallacies of arguments supporting essentialist theo-
ries and opposing intersectionality and multidimensionality: while
many progressive theorists and activists reject the intersectionality line
of criticism on the grounds that it is fragmenting, inefficient, and im-
pure, these same critics often posit or embrace essentialist theories
and politics based on the multilayered experiences of those groups
that presently exercise a privileged or dominant voice within op-
pressed communities and among equality theorists.41 Under the mul-
tidimensionality rubric, the discriminatory and essentialist rejection of
the "internal critiques" of progressive social movements becomes
problematic.42
Multidimensionality, moreover, complicates the very notions of
"privilege" and "subordination." For example, people of color have
historically suffered sexualized racism, centered around heterosexual
identity and practice.43 For instance, the heterosexual stereotype that
men of color, particularly black males, are violent sexual threats to
white women has been offered tojustifyr violent racial marginalization,
including the "institution" of lynching.44 Similarly, history has por-
trayed women of color as heterosexually promiscuous, and laws and
social practices have reduced them to sexual property in a variety of
contexts, including the legally sanctioned sexual abuse of female
38 See id. at 79-100.
39 See id. at 15-16, 96-98.
40 See Hutchinson, Out Yet Unseen, supra note 10, at 620-22.
41 See Hutchinson, Ignoring the Sexualization of Race, supra note 10, at 97 ("Anti-racists
... have confined their responses almost exclusively to those forms of sexualized racial
oppression that appear heterosexual in nature .... ."); Hutchinson, Out Yet Unseen, supra
note 10, at 621-22 ("Although [essentialist theorists] contend that race, class, and gender
detract-or are separate-from gay politics, the political vision they prescribe rests firmly
upon racial, class, and gender privilege.").
42 For a discussion of the rejection and potential rejection of "internal critiques" of
progressive theory, see Hutchinson, Dirty Laundry, supra note 15.
43 See Hutchinson, Ignoring the Sexualization of Race, supra note 10, at 17, 79-96 (discuss-
ing the discriminatory nature of essentialism and the history of sexualized racism of Afri-
can Americans, Latinos, and Asian Americans).
44 See, e.g., id. at 83.
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slaves by men of any race, particularly by white slaveowners or their
agents interested in breeding revenue-generating slaves.45 Hence,
heterosexual identity and practice have sexually marginalized persons
of color.46 This observation makes the case for multidimensionality
even stronger: if heterosexual status, typically a privileged category,
has not shielded people of color from a legacy of sexualized racism
and has, in fact, helped to justify and facilitate their domination, then
homosexual identity and practice, which are socially stigmatized, can
also serve (perhaps more potently) as instruments of racial domina-
tion. 47 Yet, while antiracist theorists and activists have thoroughly ana-
lyzed and countered heterosexual forms of racial domination, they
have not sufficiently challenged "homophobic racism," and several an-
tiracist theorists have, in fact, questioned the validity of antiheterosex-
ist politics.48 My analysis of intertwined privilege and subordination
(a departure from intersectionality) highlights the internal inconsis-
tencies and discrimination of essentialist "progressive" theories. 49
Finally, multidimensionality destabilizes the concept of "intersect-
ing subordination" that undergirds intersectional theories. Intersec-
tionality typically posits women of color as subordinate and men of
color and white women as privileged within progressive discourse and
politics.50 Including sexuality within multidimensional analyses, how-
ever, destabilizes even discrete classes such as women of color, who
admittedly endure intersecting oppressions.51 A more complex analy-
sis of heterosexism, for example, can reveal the differences in power
possessed by heterosexual women of color and lesbians of color. An
exploration of heterosexuality, alongside race, gender, and class,
moreover, calls into question the construction of men of color as privi-
leged, relative to women of color. Gay and bisexual men of color, for
example, occupy a marginalized space within antiracist theory and
political activism. Multidimensionality, by examining a variety of
sources of subordination and extending the notion of complex op-
pression to all marginalized persons, uncovers the instability of both
privilege and subordination.
Multidimensionality is therefore distinct from and related to in-
tersectionality literature. It expands this work by examining sexual
45 See, e.g., id. at 84-85.
46 See iU at 79-96.
47 See id at 98 ("If heterosexual status can become stigmatized and an instrument of
racial oppression, then it is logical and, indeed, likely that gay, lesbian, bisexual and trans-
gender identities (which are generally marginalized social categories) can also serve as
sources of racial oppression and disadvantage.").
48 See generally id. at 7, 79-81, 97 (discussing the "glaring disparity" between antiracists'
treatment of heterosexual racism and homophobic racism).
49 See id. at 97.
50 See id. at 12-14.
51 See id. at 17.
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identity (together with race, gender, and class) and the complex ex-
periences of individuals who currently dominate antisubordination
theory and politics. Multidimensionality, nevertheless, furthers the
objective of intersectionality and related scholarship by resisting the
traditional temptation to analyze systems of oppression and identity
categories as separate and essential entities. Multidimensionality
seeks to reveal the "host of interlocking sources of advantage and dis-
advantage" that sustain the "various institutions of oppression" and
corresponding identity categories.52 Utilizing the multidimensionality
framework, the remainder of this Article analyzes how equality dis-
course, in the context of legal theory, political activism, and equal pro-
tection litigation, racializes gays and lesbians as white and upper-class
in order to deny them the protection of constitutional and statutory
civil rights structures.
II
RAcE, SEXUAL IDENTITY AND EQUALITY THEORY
A. Pro-Gay and Lesbian Discourse
Race is often invoked by pro-gay and lesbian scholars who make
comparisons between people of color and gays and lesbians. Scholars
have criticized such comparisons for treating "people of color" and
"gays and lesbians" as mutually exclusive groups, omitting gays and
lesbians of color from analysis, and therefore implying a population of
white gays and lesbians and heterosexual people of color.53 The race-
sexuality analogies also distort differences in power between op-
pressed groups. For example, they obscure the effects of racial subor-
dination when they equate the experiences of white gays and lesbians
with those of persons of color. By focusing exclusively on the sexually
subordinate position of white gays and lesbians, the analogies mask
the pervasive racial privilege that supplies social benefits to white indi-
viduals regardless of their sexual identity and practice.5 4
52 Id. at 10; see also Hutchinson, Out Yet Unseen, supra note 10, at 640 ("Multidimen-
sionality exposes the various layers of social power that inform heterosexism and
homophobia. Multidimensional analysis also reveals the multiple dimensions of social
identity categories and offers a comprehensive framework for conceptualizing sexual sub-
ordination that neither 'destroys' nor 'fragments' our lives." (citation omitted)).
53 See Eaton, supra note 11, at 62 ("The possibility of cross-identification or consub-
stantial oppression is utterly unintelligible in a mode of reasoning that depends upon sepa-
ration between identities or oppressions. 'Black homosexual' is therefore an oxymoron in
an analogical comparison of blacks and homosexuals.").
54 See Hutchinson, Ignoring the Sexualization of Race, supa, note 10, at 42-44 ("[Glaims
by white gays and lesbians that they are 'the same' as blacks masks the operation of racial
privilege in white gay and lesbian experience."); Hutchinson, Out Yet Unseen, supra note 10,
at 631-32 (arguing that analogies between slavery and homophobia "ignore a legacy of
racial and class hierarchy"); Schacter, supra note 10, at 297 (arguing that race-sexuality
analogies "erase[] 'vertical' differences within a group" and "'horizontal' differences
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The race-sexuality analogies reflect a broader failure to include
racial, class, ethnic, and gender diversity within gay and lesbian dis-
course. Gay and lesbian essentialism, as a budding intellectual move-
ment observes, 55 has led to the proposal of inadequate pro-gay
policies. In particular, gay and lesbian political activism focuses much
of its resources on securing formal equality rather than on pursuing
substantive equality, or a more even distribution of material resources,
for gay, lesbian, bisexual, and transgendered individuals. The promi-
nence of same-sex marriage and military integration debates in gay
and lesbian discourse evinces the extraordinary weight given to formal
equality over material betterment.56 While the achievement of formal
equality will undoubtedly benefit all members of an oppressed class,
individuals who face structural barriers to social resources (e.g., insti-
tutionalized racism and poverty) require much broader social reform,
including policies that eradicate the pervasive material conditions of
inequality.5 7 As several scholars have observed, extreme poverty, sub-
ie and systemic discrimination, and other current effects of historical
subordination limit the benefits that a formal equality framework can
deliver to oppressed classes.58 "Privileged" members of oppressed
groups, however, may more readily take advantage of opportunities
created by the achievement of formal legal equality.59
across the spectrum of legally protected groups"); see also Margaret M. Russell, Lesbian, Gay
and Bisexual Rights and the "Civil Rights Agenda," 1 AFR.-AM. L. & POL'Y REP. 33, 37 (1994)
(recognizing that race-sexuality analogies may obscure potency of racism and marginalize
gays and lesbians of color).
55 See Hutchinson, Out Yet Unseen, supra note 10, at 563-64 n.12 (listing emergent
works on the relationships between racial and sexual identities).
56 See generally AN'RaW SuuivAN, VRTUALLY NoRMAL: AN ARGUMENT Anotrr SrxuArr
169-87 (1995) (defending marriage and military politics as necessary components of a neu-
tral state). State recognition of marriage, however, is not a neutral act because it privileges
one form of intimate relations. See Bradley P. Smith, No, I'll Categorize You, 105 YALE L.J.
2025, 2030 (1996) (book review) (criticizing Sullivan's arguments on the grounds that
"[g]overnment recognition of any marriage is an inherently nonneutral act, as it encour-
ages binary, exclusive coupling through a variety of economic incentives," and further as-
serting that "[m]arriage also infuses a variety of public rights and duties into the most
private of human relationships").
57 See Kimberi6 Williams Crenshaw, Race, Reform and Retrenchment: Transformation and
Legitimation in Antidiscrimination Law, 101 HARv. L. REv. 1331, 1383-84 (1988) ("The re-
moval of formal barriers, although symbolically significant to some, will do little to alter the
hierarchical relationship between Blacks and whites until the way in which race conscious-
ness perpetuates norms that legitimate Black subordination is revealed."); Alan David Free-
man, Legitimizing Racial Discrimination Through Antidiscrimination Law: A Critical Review of
Supreme Court Doctrine, 62 MInN. L. REv. 1049, 1050 (1978) (arguing that despite the fact
that formal racial discrimination has been outlawed in the United States, the existence of a
huge disparity between political and economic power of blacks and that of whites does not
violate antidiscrimination laws).
58 See Crenshaw, supra note 57, at 1383-84; Freeman, supra note 57, at 1050.
59 See Crenshaw, supra note 57, at 1384.
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The campaign for same-sex marriage has allowed for a rich exam-
ination of the inadequacies of formal equality and the pervasiveness of
essentialism in gay and lesbian theory and politics. 60 For example,
lesbian feminists such as Nancy Polikoff and Paula Ettelbrick have crit-
icized the pursuit of same-sex marriage on the grounds that marriage,
as an institution, has facilitated the subordination of women and the
replication of rigid and oppressive gender roles.61 This view of mar-
riage, however, differs from the analysis of some women of color, who
have argued that marriage and family life often serve as sites of resist-
ance to and comfort from racial subordination in the larger society.62
Nevertheless, marriage and family life within communities of color, as
among whites, are often marked by patriarchy and heterosexism. 63
The scattered racial critiques of same-sex marriage have not ques-
tioned the advisability of pursuing marriage altogether. Rather, race
critics challenge the extraordinary prominence given to marriage
(and other formal equality goals) within gay and lesbian politics; race
critics have also argued that many (or most) of the benefits from
same-sex marriage will accrue to white and upper-class individuals. 64
To support these arguments, my work has pointed to sociological
studies of family patterns within communities of color.65 These data
demonstrate that heterosexuals of color, particularly blacks and Lati-
nos, exercise their existing right to marry at rates far lower than those
60 See Hutchinson, Out Yet Unseen, supra note 10, at 586-602.
61 See Paula Ettelbrick, Since When Is Marriage a Path to Liberation?, in LESBIANS, GAY
MEN, AND THE LAW 401, 402 (William B. Rubenstein ed., 1993) (arguing that marriage is
"[s]teeped in a patriarchal system that looks to ownership, property, and dominance of
men over women as its basis"); Nancy D. Polikoff, We Will Get What We Ask For: Why Legaliz-
ing Gay and Lesbian Marriage Will Not "Dismantle the Legal Structure of Gender in Evey Mar-
riage, "79 VA. L. REv. 1535, 1536 (1993) (arguing that the "desire to marry... betrays the
promise of... radical feminism").
62 See BELL HOOKS, FEMINIST THEOR. FROM MARGIN TO CENTER 37 (1984) (arguing
that family life and marriage allow black women to "experience dignity, self-worth, and a
humanization that is not experienced in the outside world"); Dorothy E. Roberts, Punish-
ingDrugAddicts Who Have Babies: Women of Color, Equality, and the Right of Privacy, 104 HARv.
L. Rxv. 1419, 1470-71 (1991) (arguing that family life for women of color is a "site of solace
and resistance against racial oppression").
63 See HOOKS, supra note 62, at 37 (acknowledging that sexism exists within the context
of black families).
64 See David W. Dunlap, Some Gay Rights Advocates Question Drive to Defend Same-Sex Mar-
riage, N.Y. TimEsJune 7, 1996, atA12 ("[T]here [are] several causes 'more fundamental to
survival' for gay men and lesbians." (quoting black lesbian activist)); id. (reporting view of
Keith Boykin, executive director of the National Black Gay and Lesbian Leadership Forum,
that same-sex marriage movement is "marching down the wrong path and running a disas-
trous course," given, among other things, the pervasiveness of other forms of discrimina-
tion against gays and lesbians).
65 See Hutchinson, Out Yet Unseen, supra note 10, at 592 ("Moreover, substantial socio-
logical, historical, and anthropological research demonstrates that Africans, American
blacks, and other non-white cultures place tremendous importance on 'extended families,'
rather than rigid nuclear bodies, as a means of social organization and child rearing."
(citations omitted)).
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of whites. Sociologists attribute these differences to cultural norms
among persons of color that place greater importance on extended,
rather than nuclear, family arrangements and to economic hardships
that diminish the financial incentives traditionally associated with
marriage. 66 Thus, economic and cultural realities may render mar-
riage less attractive and less financially advantageous for gay, lesbian,
bisexual, and transgendered persons of color and the poor. Further-
more, because women, people of color, and the poor within gay and
lesbian communities experience subordination from gender, racial,
and economic hierarchies, in addition to heterosexism, the achieve-
ment of formal sexual equality, including the right to same-sex mar-
riage, will not completely insulate them from oppression 67 or place
them within "society's mainstream."68 Instead, these individuals will
remain subordinated by interwoven race, gender, class, and sexual hi-
erarchies. Consequently, the right to many would likely generate
66 See WiLLAM JuLius WLoN, THE TRULY DIsADvANTAGED: THE INNER Crrv, THE UN-
DERCLASS, AND PUBLIC POLICY 91 (1987); WILuAMJuLuUs WILSON, WHEN WORK DISAPPEARS:
THE WORLD OF THE NEv URBAN POOR 104 (1996); Lisa Catanzarite & Vilma Ortiz, Family
Matters, Work Matters? Poverty Among Women of Color and White Women, in RACE, CLASS, AND
GENDER: AN ANTHOLOGY 149-60 (Margaret L. Andersen & Patricia Hill Collins eds., 1998)
(arguing that poverty diminishes the economic benefits of marriage for women of color);
see also Jean Koh Peters, The Roles and Content of Best Interests in Client-Directed Lauyering for
Children in Child Protective Proceedings, 64 FoRDA L. REv. 1505, 1546 (1996) (arguing that
"'shared parenting responsibilities among kin' predominate in many Caribbean, African,
and African American contexts, in long-standing cultural patterns, and as a hedge against
poverty" (citation omitted)).
67 See Nitya Duclos, Some Complicating Thoughts on Same-Sex Marriage, 1 L. & SEXUALTrY
31, 51 n.75 (1991) ("Lesbians and gay men who are oppressed because of their race, cul-
ture, and/or disability will probably not find that the respectability marriage confers is
adequate to ameliorate these kinds of discrimination."); Ettelbrick, supra note 61, at 404
("[M]ore marginal members of the lesbian and gay community ... are less likely to see
marriage as having relevance to our struggles for survival. After all, what good is the affir-
mation of our relationships ... if we are rejected as women, black, or working class?");
Hutchinson, Out Yet Unseen, supra note 10, at 591 ("Because most gays and lesbians of color
remain invisible and marginalized within the larger gay and lesbian community, it is ex-
tremely unlikely that a marriage license will close much of the gulf between them and the
center of a heterosexual society that is stratified by race, class, gender, and sexuality.").
68 William N. Eskridge, Jr., A Histoy of Same-Sex Marriage, 79 VA. L. REv. 1419, 1490
(1993) ("If... dividing practices [including marital discrimination] were to collapse, [gays
and lesbians] might tend to meld back into society's mainstream, which does not inevitably
strike me as baleful."); see also SULLIVAN, supra note 56, at 185 (describing same-sex mar-
riage as "ultimately the only reform that truly matters" for gay and lesbian liberation);
Thomas Stoddard, Why Gay People Should Seek the Right to Many, in LESBIANS, GAY MEN, AND
THE LAW, supra note 61, at 398, 400 (describing marriage as "the issue most likely to lead
ultimately to a world free from discrimination against lesbians and gay men"); Evan Wolf-
son, Crossing the Threshold: Equal Marriage Rights for Lesbians and Gay Men and the Intra-Com-
munity Critique, 21 N.Y.U. Rav. L. & Soc. CHANGE 567, 581 (1994) (arguing that state
judicial opinion favoring same-sex marriage "shifted the very ground underlying gay peo-
ple's second-class status, and one of the, if not the major, barriers to our full and equal
citizenship has cracked wide open"). For a discussion of how these arguments reflect the
whiteness, maleness, and upper-class status of pro-gay and lesbian theorists, see Hutchin-
son, Out Yet Unseen, supra note 10, at 589-602.
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greater social benefits for race- and class-privileged members of the
gay, lesbian, bisexual, and transgendered population.
By excluding persons of color and the poor from pro-gay and
lesbian equality discourse, legal and political commentators imply a
narrowness of the gay and lesbian community that does not reflect
reality. Though perhaps unintended, the clear result of this omission
is the construction of the gay and lesbian community as white and
economically privileged, given the correlation of race and economic
status. The immediate repercussion of this narrow construction of
gay, lesbian, bisexual, and transgendered identity is the inadequacy of
policies that advocates of gay and lesbian equality propose; these es-
sentialist policies fail to confront the diverse oppressions that shape
heterosexism. The racial and class nornativity present in pro-gay and
lesbian politics and theory has a broader, and perhaps more ominous
effect: it lends credibility to a racialized and class-based depiction of
the gay and lesbian community by anti-gay theorists, activists, and ju-
rists in their arguments against legal protection of all gays and lesbians
from discrimination.
B. Anti-Gay Politics: "Gay Rights" as "Special Rights"
Activists and theorists opposed to gay and lesbian equality also
depict gays and lesbians as white and privileged. Commonly, the nar-
row racial and class construction of gays and lesbians in the anti-gay
context appears in the "special rights" rhetoric, 69 which anti-gay advo-
cates employ to depict the gay and lesbian community as affluent,
well-educated, privileged, and, therefore, undeserving of civil rights
protection. 70 The special rights rhetoric asserts that gays and lesbians
are simply using their disproportional "political power" to control the
civil rights machinery in states and municipalities in order to secure
"special protection" of their lifestyle. 71 Though it is sometimes facially
neutral with respect to race, the special rights discourse actually racial-
izes gay, lesbian, bisexual, and transgendered individuals as white,
privileged, and upper-class. This racialization occurs in at least three
ways.
First, the special rights rhetoric racializes gays and lesbians
through the explicit comparison of "gays and lesbians" and "person of
color." Users of the rhetoric claim that gays and lesbians, unlike
69 For a more extensive explication of the racial and class dimensions of the "special
rights" rhetoric, see Hutchinson, Ignoring the Sexualization of Race, supra note 10, at 68-74.
70 See Schacter, supra note 10, at 293-94 (discussing these elements of special rights
rhetoric); see also Hutchinson, Ignoring the Sexualization of Race, supra note 10, at 69 (same).
71 See Hutchinson, Ignoring the Sexualization of Race, supra note 10, at 69-70 (observing
that anti-gay forces claim that gay and lesbian civil rights will give protection to a powerful
group, protection previously reserved for the "truly disadvantaged"); Schacter, supra note
10, at 291-93 (same).
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blacks and other persons of color, are wealthy and privileged and,
therefore, peculiar candidates for statutory or constitutional antidis-
crimination protection.72 This comparative dimension of the special
rights rhetoric, like the comparative analysis of race and sexuality in
the pro-gay context, imagines persons of color and gays and lesbians
as separate populations, thereby excluding gays and lesbians of color
from examination and constructing the gay and lesbian community as
white and upper-class. 73
The special rights rhetoric constructs gays and lesbians as white,
upper-class, and privileged in a second way-by citing racially- and
class-biased data purporting to demonstrate gay wealth. 74 Scholars
have criticized several popular surveys that purport to show that gays
and lesbians are disproportionately wealthy because these polls typi-
cally survey openly gay and lesbian individuals, persons who subscribe
to political magazines, and donors to gay and lesbian political organi-
zations whose names appear on these groups' mailing lists.75 Empiri-
cal research suggests that the individuals represented in these samples
are disproportionately wealthy and white. Individuals who donate
money to political organizations or subscribe to magazines, for exam-
ple, typically possess greater wealth than the larger population, irre-
spective of sexuality.7 6 Furthermore, to the extent that racial and class
subordination impair the ability of gays and lesbians of color and the
poor to express openly their sexual orientation (for fear of further
marginalization), samples of "out" gays and lesbians will incorrectly
portray the gay and lesbian population as largely white and upper-
class.7 7 In addition, some scholars have recently begun to document
72 See Hutchinson, Ignoring the Sexualization of Race, supra note 10, at 72-73; Schacter,
supra note 10, at 291-92.
73 See Hutchinson, Ignoring the Sexualization of Race, supra note 10, at 72-73.
74 See id. at 70-72.
75 See URVASHI VAID, VIRTuAL EQUALrTY. THE MAINStREAMING OF GAY AND LESBIAN LIB-
ERATION 252-55 (1995); M.V. Lee Badgett, Beyond Biased Samples: Challenging the Myths on the
Economic Status of Lesbians and Gay Men, in HoMo ECONoMIcs: CAPITALISM, COMMUNrrY AND
LESBI.N AND GAY LrE 65, 65-71 (Amy Gluckman & Betsy Reed eds., 1997); Hutchinson,
Ignoring the Sexualization of Race, supra note 10, at 70-71; Hutchinson, Out Yet Unseen, supra
note 10, at 605-08; Samuel A. Marcosson, The "Special Rights" Canard in the Debate Over Les-
bian and Gay Civil Rights, 9 NoTRE DAmE J.L. Emics & PuB. POL'Y 137, 160 n.69 (1995).
76 See VAin, supra note 75, at 254 (citing study finding income levels of periodical
subscribers exceed national average); Hutchinson, Ignoring the Sexualization of Race, supra
note 10, at 70-71 (same); Hutchinson, Out Yet Unseen, supra note 10, at 606 (same).
77 See VAIm, supra note 75, at 256 (arguing that "middle-class and wealthy gay people
are far more likely to be visible than are working-class and poor queers"); Hutchinson, Out
Yet Unseen, supra note 10, at 608 (arguing that gays and lesbians of color often do not reveal
their sexual orientation "because they fear the 'horrible risk ... [of] further disen-
franchisetment].'" (ellipses and bracketed text in original (citation omitted))); Marcos-
son, supra note 75, at 160 n.69 (arguing that open gays and lesbians "are those who are in a
position of relative comfort and security, and not those in a position of relative economic
insecurity, for whom the loss of their job or home if their sexual orientation became
known would be most catastrophic").
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the economic harm of sexual orientation discrimination.78 Their
work has set in motion the important project of dissecting the "gay
wealth" surveys, which create a popular, inaccurate and, ultimately,
negative picture of the gay and lesbian community as disproportion-
ately white, upper-class, and privileged.
Finally, the special rights rhetoric racializes gays and lesbians as
white by attempting to disaggregate racial subjugation from heterose-
xism. Proponents of the "special rights" rhetoric argue that heterose-
xism does not warrant the attention of the statutory and constitutional
civil rights apparatus because heterosexism is not as injurious (if it is
injurous at all) as racism.79 This argument, however, does not con-
sider the ways in which racism and homophobia interact to shape sub-
ordination, particularly the subordination of persons of color who are
also gay, lesbian, bisexual, or transgendered. For these individuals,
racial subjugation and heterosexism are not neatly separable.80 In-
deed, the racially subordinate position of gays and lesbians of color
informs their experiences in a variety of contexts, including their abil-
ity to express publicly their sexual identity, their vulnerability to op-
pressive violence 8l and the frequently inadequate response to such
violence by law enforcement, and their access to medical care in an
era of AIDS and HIV.8 2 By treating questions of racial oppression as
separate from, and more important than, questions of heterosexism,
proponents of the special rights rhetoric assume a population of indi-
viduals unaffected, collectively or synergistically, by both forms of sub-
ordination. Clearly, the experiences of gays and lesbians of color
refute this essentialist assumption.
The racialized special rights discourse has colored many political
disputes over gay and lesbian equality. For instance, during the cam-
paign to pass Amendment 2 to the Colorado Constitution-a now in-
validated8 3 provision that repealed (and banned the future enactment
of) state and local laws protecting gays and lesbians from discrimina-
tion-proponents of the amendment frequently claimed that ex-
78 See Badgett, supra note 75, at 69-70.
79 See Schacter, supra note 10, at 291 (observing that opponents of gay rights depict
.comfortable gay and lesbian lives against which the 'true' disadvantage of existing pro-
tected groups is dramatically juxtaposed").
80 Similarly, questions of race and sexuality are not neatly separable for white gays
and lesbians. The racial issue that shapes the experiences of whites, however, is racial
privilege, rather than racial subjugation.
81 Because terms such as "hate crimes" or "bias crimes" distort the systematic, struc-
tural, and political dimensions of acts of violence against members of socially subordinate
groups, I refer to such crimes as acts of "oppressive violence." See Hutchinson, Ignoring the
Sexualization of Race, supra note 10, at 17-20.
82 See id. at 100-01.
83 See Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996) (invalidating Amendment 2 as violative of
equal protection).
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tending civil rights protection to gays and lesbians would afford them
special rights. One organization, the Traditional Values Coalition,
employed a strategy that blatantly racialized the gay and lesbian com-
munity as white. This group developed a video entitled "Gay Rights/
Special Rights"8 4 that contained footage of largely white gay and les-
bian festivals, juxtaposed with footage from predominantly black
1960s protest marches (for instance, the March on Washington). 85
The voiceover contrasted gay experience with black experience by list-
ing the abuses blacks have suffered historically and arguing that gays
do not share this history. The video was distributed to black churches
and black politicians in order to mobilize black support for the
amendment. Thus, the Traditional Values Coalition explicitly de-
picted gays and blacks as separate populations with separate histories
and needs and sought to generate black support for Amendment 2 by
fueling black fear that whites would receive civil rights protection, ap-
pealing to black homophobia, and stoking racial tensions between
heterosexual blacks and white gays and lesbians.86 As this example
demonstrates, unless law and sexuality theorists adopt a multidimen-
sional analysis of heterosexism, their analyses will not adequately
counter the manipulation of race by anti-gay activists.
C. Heteronormative Antiracist Discourse
Antiracist theory and activism also marginalize gays, lesbians,
bisexuals, and the transgendered of color and contribute to the con-
struction of the harmful "gay as white and privileged" stereotype. An-
tiracists racialize gays and lesbians as white primarily through their
heteronormative depiction of racial subjugation and people of color.
This depiction occurs in at least two ways. First, antiracist scholars and
activists treat racial subjugation and heterosexist oppression as sepa-
rate forces and thus fail to address the often unique subordination
endured by gays, lesbians, bisexuals, and the transgendered of color.
Second, antiracists, like avowedly anti-gay activists, compare gays and
lesbians and persons of color in order to undermine efforts to protect
gays and lesbians from discrimination.8 7
84 Videotape: Gay Rights/Special Rights (Traditional Values Coalition 1993).
85 For discussions of different interest groups' manipulation of race to further anti-
gay agendas, see, for example, Hutchinson, Ignoring the Sexualization of Race, supra note 10,
at 72-73; Russell, supra note 54, at 48-49; Schacter, supra note 10, at 292; Farai Chideya, How
the Right Stirs Black Homophobia, NavswEwx, Oct. 18, 1993, at 73, 73; Sara Diamond, Watch on
the Right: Change in Strategy, HumAmsT, Jan. 1994, at 34, 34-36; Nadine Smith, Homophobia:
Will It Divide Us?, ESSENCE, June 1994, at 128, 128.
86 See Russell, supra note 54, at 49.
87 For a fuller examination of heteronormativity in antiracist discourse, see generally
Hutchinson, Ignoring the Sexualization of Race, supra note 10, at 40-100.
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In previous writings, I have examined how racism, patriarchy,
poverty, and heterosexism interact to shape the subordination of gay,
lesbian, bisexual, and transgendered people of color. Using empiri-
cal, journalistic, and other research, my work has considered the ways
in which these intersecting systems of oppression create racial pat-
terns of victimization in areas as diverse as oppressive violence,88
health care (particularly in the context of AIDS and HIV infection
and treatment), employment, cultural expression, and political or-
ganizing. 9 Despite these "sexualized" patterns of racial discrimina-
tion and subordination, antiracists have not proposed significant
theories that adequately respond to the synergistic relationship of ra-
cism and heterosexism. Indeed, as this Article discusses below, several
antiracist scholars have explicitly questioned the need to protect gays,
lesbians, bisexuals, and the transgendered from discrimination. Nev-
ertheless, these scholars have not refused to recognize or challenge all
manifestations of sexualized racism; rather, they have limited their
theories to sexualized racism in its heterosexual forms.90 For in-
stance, a diverse body of antiracist scholarship has analyzed the ways
in which racialized notions of the heterosexual practices and desires
of persons of color have historically constructed them as deviant. Fur-
ther, as this antiracist work reveals, racialized notions of heterosexual
practices have provided a 'Justificatory" rhetoric to legitimize acts of
brutality and other injustices against all people of color.9' The histori-
cal legacy of sexualized racism, which has engendered a substantial
amount of antiracist activism, should place antiracist theorists on no-
tice that they need to analyze the heterosexist dimensions of racism.
For if heterosexuality, typically a privileged category, can facilitate ra-
cial subjugation, then homosexuality, a socially stigmatized category,
can also serve, possibly more potently, as a site of racial domination. 92
The omission of responses to homophobic racism by antiracist theory
creates a discriminatory, heteronormative model of racial justice in
which heterosexual status qualifies individuals as subjects for antiracist
activism and analysis. 93 This narrow, essentialist vision of racial jus-
tice, moreover, marginalizes and renders invisible gays, lesbians, bisex-
uals, and transgendered people of color and therefore reinforces the
88 See supra note 81.
89 See Hutchinson, Ignoring the Sexualization of Race, supra note 10, at 100-01.
90 See id. at 79-96 (citing sources).
91 This work has examined the lynching of black males, the sexual assault of black
women during and after slavery, the "importation" of Asian women to satisfy male sexual
desire, the sexual abuse of Latinas during American imperialist conquest, sexualized and
gendered brutality against Asian and Latino males, and the complicity of legal authorities
with all of these forms of sexualized racial subordination. See id.
92 See id. at 98.
93 See id. at 97.
1376 [Vol. 85:1358
"GAY RIGHTS" FOR "GAY WHITES"?
popular, harmful notion that all gays and lesbians are white, upper-
class, and privileged.
Antiracist scholars also construct heteronormative racial theories
when they question or reject arguments for including gays, lesbians,
bisexuals, and transgendered people within existing civil rights struc-
tures. The most prevalent antiracist rejection of antiheterosexist poli-
tics has occurred in comparisons of gays and lesbians with persons of
color or racism with heterosexism. Antiracists have juxtaposed race
and sexuality to counter the use of race-sexuality analogies by advo-
cates of gay and lesbian equality. Many persons of color have chal-
lenged the analogies for their obfuscation of white gay and lesbian
racial privilege. While this antiessentialist critique of the race-sexual-
ity analogies follows from critical theory, the antiracist and person of
color retorts impede progressive projects because they often reinforce
heterosexism and, like the comparative approach to race and sexuality
used by pro- and anti-gay forces, further marginalize gay, lesbian, bi-
sexual, and transgendered people of color.94
For example, in response to gay and lesbian race-sexuality analo-
gies, several antiracist theorists have argued that anti-heterosexism
cannot fit within the existing civil rights framework because "homo-
sexuality" is "behavioral," "chosen," and may be concealed, while ra-
cial status is an immutable, visible, "physical" trait that triggers
inescapable subjugation.95 This argument obscures the social dimen-
sions of race and the harms that result from the "closet." It also con-
structs the gay and lesbian community as white. 96 The race-sexuality
critics of the analogies assume that gays and lesbians and persons of
color are separate communities and that the subordination of the for-
mer is less severe because gays and lesbians can "pass"-or conceal the
"chosen" ground of their oppression. This logic, however, depends
upon the invisibility of gays and lesbians of color. Although it is im-
portant to analyze the privilege possessed by certain members of
94 See id. at 44.
95 For a collection of antiracist and person of color responses to the race-sexuality
analogies, see John Sibley Butler, Homosexuals and the Military Establishment; 31 SociErv 13,
18-21 (1993); Lynne Duke, DrawingParallels-Gays and Blacks: Linking Military Ban to Integra-
tion Fight Stirs Outrage, Sympathy, WASH. POST, Feb. 13, 1993, at Al; Susan Feeney, Echoes from
the Past: Sides at Odds over Parallel of Military Integration, Gay Ban, DALLAS MORNING NEWs,
May 23, 1993, atJ1; David Lightman, To Congressman, Military's Gay Ban Not Like Racial Bias,
HARTFoRD CouANrr, Aug. 16, 1993, at A1;Joe Rogers, Spare Us the Comparisons Between Gays
and Blacks, WASH. TiNirs, July 29, 1994, at A21; Lena Williams, Blacks Reject Gay Rights Fight
as Equal to Theirs, N.Y. TIMEs, June 28, 1993, at Al; Larry Witham, Black Clergy Balk at Gays
Sharing Rights Umbrella, WASH. TiMS, Jan. 23, 1993, at A3. Not all of the responses were
negative. See Holly Morris, Civil Rights Leaders Back End to Military's Gay Ban, ATLANTAJ. &
CoNsr., July 1, 1993, at C8; Williams, supra, at Al (noting support of gay rights by Coretta
Scott King, Jesse Jackson, and NAACP and reporting survey indicating greater black than
white support for end of military's homophobic practices).
96 See Hutchinson, Ignoring the Sexualization of Race, supra note 10, at 71-74.
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subordinate communities, the analogy critics assume that the white
gay community is monolithically advantaged and that people of color
are monolithically subordinated.
The actual position of gays, lesbians, bisexuals, and trans-
gendered people of color belies the critics' portrait. Because heter-
osexism marginalizes gays and lesbians of color and privileges
heterosexuals of color, it stratifies the population of "people of color"
by sexual identity and practice. Thus, in dismissing gay rights, an-
tiracist critics who resist the race-sexuality analogies deny the exis-
tence of gay, lesbian, bisexual, and transgendered people of color,
ignore the ways in which heterosexism both oppresses and creates
privilege within communities of color, and thus help perpetuate the
notion that gays and lesbians are uniformly privileged, upper-class,
and white.97
III
EQUAL PROTECTION ANALYSIS
The theoretical backdrop to anti-gay and lesbian rights discourse
is an image of gays and lesbians as a wealthy, white, privileged class,
who, unlike traditional "minorities," do not merit legislative civil
rights protection or heightened judicial review of their claims of gov-
ernmental discrimination. Ironically, pro-gay and lesbian advocacy
does not deconstruct, but rather reinforces, this harmful stereotype of
gay privilege. Moreover, this same discourse and particularly the por-
trayal of gay rights as special rights, has been invoked by judges and
parties in constitutional litigation. Two important federal cases, High
Tech Gays v. Defense Industrial Security Clearing Office0 8 and Romer v. Ev-
ans,99 illustrate how the racialized special rights discourse can impede
the quest for gay and lesbian equality in constitutional litigation.
A. High Tech Gays
In High Tech Gays, a group of gays and lesbians challenged a De-
fense Department policy of conducting expanded investigations into
the backgrounds of gay and lesbian applicants for federal employ-
ment security clearance. 100 As a result of the discriminatory back-
ground investigations, the government routinely denied gays and
lesbians clearance on the ground that they allegedly posed height-
97 For a critique of the essentializing nature of the antiracist and person of color
retorts to the race-sexuality analogies, see id. at 41-58; Hutchinson, Out Yet Unseen, supra
note 10, at 625-34.
98 895 F.2d 563 (9th Cir. 1990).
99 517 U.S. 620 (1996).
100 See High Tech Gays, 895 F.2d at 565.
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ened security risks due to the potential for blackmail and other
problems.101
The plaintiffs argued that the policy violated the equal protection
component of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. 0 2
Although the district court found that gays and lesbians were a quasi-
suspect class and, applying intermediate scrutiny, invalidated the pol-
icy, a panel of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed. 10 3 The
reasoning of the Ninth Circuit parallels the special rights discourse: it
explicitly compares "gays and lesbians" and "persons of color" and
characterizes gays and lesbians as a "powerful" social group.'0 4
The Ninth Circuit invoked the Supreme Court's suspect class doc-
trine to consider heightened scrutiny for governmental discrimina-
tion against gays and lesbians.10 5 Specifically, the court inquired
whether gays and lesbians have endured a "history of discrimination,"
whether they possess "obvious, immutable, or distinguishing charac-
teristics that define them as a discrete group," or whether they are
"politically powerless."'106 This framework arises out of the Court's ex-
acting analysis of racial classifications and the development of the pro-
cess-based heightened scrutiny framework anticipated in footnote
four of United States v. Carolene Products Co.'0 7
The Ninth Circuit found that governmental discrimination
against gays and lesbians does not warrant the application of height-
ened scrutiny. The court held that while gays and lesbians have suf-
fered a history of discrimination, they do not possess the other indicia
of suspect status. The court justified this decision on two grounds.
First, the court reasoned that "[h] omosexuality is not an immutable
characteristic; it is behavioral and hence is fundamentally different
from traits such as race, gender, or alienage, which define already ex-
isting suspect and quasi-suspect classes.' 0 8 The invocation of immuta-
bility in gay and lesbian equal protection analysis is problematic from
various doctrinal and social perspectives as scholars such as Janet Hal-
ley have argued. 10 9 Other vulnerable groups, such as "permanent resi-
101 See id. at 568-69.
102 See id. at 569.
103 See High Tech Gays v. Defense Indus. Sec. Clearing Office, 668 F. Supp. 1361 (N.D. Cal.
1987), rev'd, 895 F.2d 563 (9th Cir. 1990).
104 See High Tech Gays, 895 F.2d at 573-74.
105 See id. at 573.
106 I&
107 304 U.S. 144 (1938). See GERsrmANN, supra note 1, at 24 ("The modem formula-
tion of suspect classifications emerged from a synthesis of perhaps the single most famous
case and the single most famous footnote in constitutional history: Brown v. Board of Educ-
tion and footnote 4 of United States v. Carolene Products Co." (footnotes omitted)).
108 High Tech Gays, 895 F.2d at 573.
109 SeeJanet E. Halley, Sexual Orientation and the Politics of Biology: A Critique of the Argu-
ment from Immutability, 46 STAN. L. Rn-v. 503, 563-68 (1994); see also Kenji Yoshino, Assimila-
tionist Bias in Equal Protection: The Visibility Presumption and the Case of "Don't Ask, Don't Tell,"
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dents" and "non-marital children," do not have to make similar
immutability demonstrations." 0 Furthermore, describing race and
sex as immutable "traits" distorts the socially constructed nature of
these categories."' Finally, a doctrinal requirement of immutability
compels homogeneity. Rather than questioning the legitimacy or
value of discriminatory practices, it demands that oppressed people
"change" to fit within a presumably "valid" social structure that, in re-
ality, embraces oppressive hierarchies.
The immutability analysis also illustrates the centrality of the com-
parative discussion of race and sexual identity in gay, lesbian, bisexual,
and transgendered equal protection claims. The Ninth Circuit, like
anti-gay political activists, searched for similarities between gays and
lesbians and persons of color (and other suspect classes whose "sus-
pect" statuses emerged from a context of race-based equal protection
cases). After claiming to find no parallels between race and sexuality,
the court denied judicial solicitude to gays and lesbians.
Second, the court found that gays and lesbians failed to demon-
strate that they were politically powerless. This finding echoes anti-
gay claims that gays, lesbians, bisexuals, and the transgendered are a
politically powerful class. The court reasoned that
[1] egislatures have addressed and continue to address the discrimi-
nation suffered by homosexuals on account of their sexual orienta-
tion through the passage of anti-discrimination legislation. Thus,
homosexuals are not without political power; they have the ability to
and do attract the attention of the lawmakers as evidenced by such
legislation. 12
While the court did not explicitly describe the gay and lesbian com-
munity as white, wealthy, and privileged, its citation of state statutory
protection of gay and lesbian status as reflective of gay and lesbian
political power echoes the racialized and class-based special rights dis-
course, 1 3 which characterizes civil rights protection of gays and lesbi-
108 YALE LJ. 485, 520-38 (1998) (describing the "illogic of the immutability and the visibil-
ity presumptions").
110 See Halley, supra note 109, at 507-16; Yoshino, supra note 109, at 490-93.
I1I See Yoshino, supra note 109, at 493-500.
112 High Tech Gays, 895 F.2d at 574 (internal quotation marks omitted).
113 A reasonable alternative interpretation of the High Tech Gays decision would not
link the holding to the special rights rhetoric. Instead the outcome of the case could
arguably rest on City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S. 432 (1985), in which the
Court held that the "mentally retarded" do not constitute a quasi-suspect class because they
are not politically powerless. Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 445 ("[T]he legislative response, which
could hardly have occurred and survived without public support, negates any claim that
the mentally retarded are politically powerless in the sense that they have no ability to
attract the attention of the lawmakers."). In Cleburne, the Court cited scattered congres-
sional enactments protecting the "mentally retarded" from discrimination in order tojus-
tifyr its conclusion that this class possessed political power. See id The High Tech Gays
opinion explicitly relies upon Cleburne in its similarly narrow analysis of gay and lesbian
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axis an an unfair advantage for a privileged, politically powerful, and
influential class that manipulates the legislative process to its
advantage." 4
B. Romer v. Evans: Justice Scalia's Dissent
A more comprehensive version of the racialized special rights
rhetoric appears injustice Scalia's dissenting opinion filed in Romer v.
Evans.i 15 While the majority applied rational basis review and invali-
dated Amendment 2, Justice Scalia contested this result, and his dis-
senting opinion invoked the special rights rhetoric that colored the
political discourse surrounding the passage of Amendment 2. Scalia
argued that:
Because those who engage in homosexual conduct tend to reside in
disproportionate numbers in certain communities, have high dis-
posable income, and of course, care about homosexual rights issues
much more ardently than the public at large, they possess political
power much greater than their numbers, both locally and statewide. Quite
understandably, they devote this political power to achieving not merely a
grudging social toleration, but full social acceptance, of homosexuality.11 6
"political power." See High Tech Gays, 895 F.2d at 574 ("Moreover, legislatures have ad-
dressed and continue to address the discrimination suffered by homosexuals on account of
their sexual orientation through the passage of anti-discrimination legislation. Thus,
homosexuals are not without political power; they have the ability to and do 'attract the
attention of the lawmakers,' as evidenced by such legislation." (citing Cleburne, 473 U.S. at
445)). Despite the potential doctrinal overlap between these two cases, there are impor-
tant differences in their outcomes. First, although the Court in Cleburne failed to recognize
mental retardation as a classification warranting heightened scrutiny, it, nevertheless, ap-
plied a "strong" rational basis review and invalidated the discriminatory policy at issue. See
Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 450 (invalidating policy under a purported rationality review because
"requiring the permit... appears to... rest on an irrational prejudice against the mentally
retarded"). The Ninth Circuit, by contrast, was exceedingly deferential in its analysis of the
governmental interests. The court justified its extraordinarily deferential review on the
fact that the case involved a challenge to an executive branch policy over questions of
classified information. See High Tech Gays, 895 F.2d at 577 ("Special deference must be
given by the court to the Executive Branch when adjudicating matters involving their deci-
sions on protecting classified information..."). In any event, the potential doctrinal simi-
larities between Cleburne and High Tech Gays do not preclude the operation of special rights
considerations in the latter case, given the pervasive association of gays and lesbians with
political power in contemporary legal and political discourse.
114 This position is inconsistent with how civil rights law treats "other" protected
groups. For example, each group has privileged members, yet civil rights law provides a
legal remedy for their discrimination. This curious logic, however, has also surfaced in
legal scholarship. See Richard F. Duncan, Who Wants to Stop the Church: Homosexual Rights
Legislation, Public Policy, and Religious Freedom, 69 Nom-E DAmE L. Rxv. 393, 409 (1994)
("[T]he available evidence indicates that [discrimination against homosexuals] is neither
pervasive nor economically devastating. Not only are homosexuals an affluent and highly
educated class, they are also politically powerful.").
115 ChiefJustice Rehnquist and Justice Thomas joined this dissent.
116 Romer, 517 U.S. at 645-46 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citations omitted, emphasis
added).
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Similarly, Scalia characterized Amendment 2 as "a modest attempt by
seemingly tolerant Coloradans to preserve traditional sexual mores
against the efforts of a politically powerful minority to revise those mores
through the use of the laws."" 7 Finally, Scalia criticized the majority
for "placing the prestige of [the Court] behind the proposition that
opposition to homosexuality is as reprehensible as racial or religious
bias.""18
Justice Scalia's arguments closely parallel every element of the
racialized special rights rhetoric. He describes gays and lesbians as
wealthy and politically powerful, and therefore undeserving ofjudicial
protection. He characterizes gay and lesbian civil rights efforts as an
exertion of this disproportionate power. Finally, he separates and im-
plicitly contrasts gays and lesbians and persons of color by implying
that opposition to homosexuality is not as reprehensible as-and
therefore not related to-racial bias.
The decision in High Tech Gays, the Romer dissent, and the special
rights rhetoric in political discourse demonstrate how race is deployed
in opposition to gay and lesbian equality efforts. In such political and
juridicial discourses, the subjugation of persons of color is juxtaposed
with the presumed privilege of gays and lesbians in order to suggest
that the latter are unworthy of civil rights protection. By separating
gays and lesbians from persons of color for comparative treatment,
treating racism and heterosexism as unconnected forces, and relying
upon racially- and class-biased statistical data, proponents of the spe-
cial rights rhetoric, including jurists, characterize gays and lesbians as
white and invoke their "whiteness" to deny them civil rights
protection.
Ironically, the misleading racial rhetoric deployed by anti-gay ac-
tivists and courts mirrors the discourse of mainstream pro-gay forces
in one crucial respect: both groups construct the gay and lesbian com-
munity as white and upper-class. Because essentialist pro-gay com-
mentators actually legitimize and reinforce the harmful, white
construction of the gay and lesbian community that informs anti-gay
discourse, they must rethink and reconstruct their approach to sexual
identity, heterosexism, and race. Only a multidimensional approach
to the problem of subordination, one that analyzes the multiple axes
of identity and oppression and treats race as an integral component of
sexual identity and subordination, can marshal an effective response
to the essentialization of gay identity through the special rights
discourse.
117 Id. at 636 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
118 Id. (ScaliaJ., dissenting).
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IV
TowARD MULTmimENsIoNAIY iN EQUALITY DIScoURSE
A. The Role of Multidimensional Analysis
In order to strip the special rights rhetoric of legitimacy, legal
scholars must first embrace an integrated-rather than comparative-
analysis of race and class in their advocacy of gay and lesbian rights." 9
A multidimensional approach to the question of race within sexuality
discourse, one that uncovers the racial, classed, and gendered dimen-
sions of heterosexist oppression and anti-gay discourse, can more ac-
curately depict sexual subordination and destabilize the false image of
a privileged white gay and lesbian community undeserving of civil
rights protection. Such a multidimensional gay rights discourse can
serve as the basis for re-representing gay and lesbian subjectivity and
for obtaining civil rights protection of transgressive sexual identities.
B. Immediate Implications of a Multidimensional Pro-Gay and
Lesbian Discourse
Adopting a multidimensional lens for scrutinizing heterosexism
can affect equality discourse in at least three ways. First, a mul-
tidimensional framework suggests the need to decenter privilege in
progressive theory. Second, multidimensionality exposes the need to
relax the rigid comparative approach to equal protection analysis. Fi-
nally, multidimensionality uncovers the contradictory and indetermi-
nate nature of traditional rights-based equality jurisprudence.
1. Decentering Privilege in Progressive Theory
The racialized discourse of anti-gay theorists and jurists portrays
gays and lesbians as white, wealthy, and undeserving of protection by
119 Although a multidimensional analysis of subordination ultimately must be em-
ployed to deconstruct the special rights rhetoric, some elements of that argument can be
challenged without recurring to multidimensional analysis. For example, the notion that
wealth disqualifies a social group for heightened scrutiny is problematic, given the applica-
tion of heightened scrutiny to the discrimination claims of other groups (in particular
whites) who also have wealthy individuals, and given continued application of rationality
review to equal protection claims brought by the poor. Furthermore, if the mere existence
of statutory prohibitions of discrimination against a particular group disqualifies that
group from suspect or quasi-suspect status (as it did in Cleburne and in High Tech Gays),
then none of the existing suspect classes would receive heightened scrutiny, because civil
rights legislation seeks to protect each of them. In addition, equal protection doctrine
becomes contradictory when the Court applies heightened scrutiny to discrimination
claims brought by whites, who cannot as a class be described as "politically powerless" or as
having suffered from a history of discrimination, but deny suspect status to gays and lesbi-
ans on the ground that sexual identity is "mutable" or that gays and lesbians possess polit-
ical power. Yet, despite the possibility of challenging special rights arguments with the
vocabulary of the traditional analysis, multidimensionality is ultimately required to decon-
struct its racial (and class) distortions.
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civil rights structures. While I would argue that gays and lesbians as a
class, regardless of their individual race, class, or gender, warrant civil
rights protection given the harms of heterosexism, pro-gay theorists
should nevertheless deconstruct this racialized discourse by exploring
the diverse axes of class, race, gender, and sexuality along which gays
and lesbians are situated. An explication of the multiple layers and
effects of heterosexism destabilizes the privileged, essentialist con-
struction of gay, lesbian, bisexual, and transgendered status.
Despite the insidious deployment of "gay and lesbian privilege" in
equality discourse, pro-gay, lesbian, bisexual, and transgendered activ-
ists have not attempted to unearth the harmful material effects of
heterosexism. 120 Gay and lesbian studies and activism, instead, re-
main centered around the experiences of privileged individuals-
men, whites, and the wealthy-whose lives, marked by social advan-
tage, tend to affirm the notion of gay privilege. Several factors explain
the centrality of privilege in gay and lesbian theory and activism. The
debilitating effects of intertwined poverty, racism, patriarchy, and
heterosexism render the most vulnerable members of the gay and les-
bian population less visible;' 2 ' gay and lesbian activism and legal advo-
cacy are dominated by privileged individuals who have historically
failed to comprehend, challenge, or feel concern for the subordina-
tion endured by less powerful gays and lesbians;122 and racism, sexism,
and class insensitivity plague gay and lesbian theory and activism. 123
In addition, gay rights activists pursue white and upper-class political
agendas in order to ingratiate themselves with white and upper-class
power structures; they assert their white and upper-class statuses in
order to gain "respectability" in the eyes of a heterosexist, racist, class-
stratified, and sexist society.12 4 The immediate effect of the centrality
of privilege in gay and lesbian activism and other progressive move-
120 See, e.g., Ruthann Robson, To Market, To Market: Considering Class in the Context of
Lesbian Legal Theorin and Reforms, 5 S. CAL. REv. L. & WOMEN'S STUD. 173, 182 (1995)
(criticizing gay and lesbian legal theorists for failing to "effectively counter[ ]" the percep-
tion of gay and lesbian wealth).
121 See supra notes 77-78 and accompanying text (discussing how racism and poverty
diminish one's ability to "come out").
122 See Hutchinson, Out Yet Unseen, supra note 10, at 641 n.332 ("Narrow equality theo-
ries and political resistance... result because theorists and activists fail to acknowledge
their own racial and class privileges and how these privileges shape their discourses.").
123 See id. at 620-35.
124 See, e.g., WiuLAm N. EsKRIDGE, JR., THE CASE FOR SAME-SEX MARRIAGE: FROM SEXUAL
LIBERW TO CIVLIZED CoMMrrMENT 83-84 (1996) (arguing that same-sex marriage will "civi-
lize" and provide "discipline" for gay men); Ettelbrick, supra note 61, at 404 (arguing that
same-sex marriage appeals to race, class, and gender privileged individuals because it is
their "final acceptance, the ultimate affirmation of [their] identity"); Hutchinson, Out Yet
Unseen, supra note 10, at 591 ("[Plersons who face multiple oppressions and those who
possess social privileges will likely have disparate views on the ability of marriage to place
them within structures of power and acceptability and to transform radically their lives.").
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ments is the marginalization and invisibility of, and diversion of re-
sources from, gay, lesbian, bisexual, and transgendered people who
are poor or of color. Ultimately, however, the prominence of social
advantage within gay and lesbian equality discourse lends credibility
to an inaccurate, racialized, anti-gay discourse that would deny equal-
ity to all sexually transgressive individuals.
Multidimensional analysis provides a needed theoretical frame-
work for decentering privilege in gay and lesbian and other progres-
sive social movements. Multidimensionality engages all of the
"interlocking sources of advantage and disadvantage" that sustain the
"various institutions of oppression" and corresponding identity cate-
gories used to justify them.125 Accordingly, a multidimensional analy-
sis of heterosexist subordination would not simply uncover the
problem of formal inequality for gays and lesbians and examine "gay
experience" as delimited by whiteness, maleness, and class privilege.
Instead, a multidimensional gay liberation theory would unveil the di-
verse material, social, and emotional harms caused by intertwined ra-
cism, sexism, poverty, and heterosexism. These varied injustices call
for a more comprehensive analysis of heterosexist oppression, and
they belie the depiction of gay, lesbian, bisexual, and transgendered
identity as privileged. It is therefore imperative that gay and lesbian
advocates employ a multidimensional lens for analyzing the condi-
tions of heterosexism.
2. Relaxation of Rigidly "Comparative" Equal Protection Analysis
The second implication of a multidimensional approach to sub-
ordination is a relaxation of an often rigid comparative approach to
equality in constitutional and statutory civil rights contexts. Under
the traditional comparative approach, social groups seeking height-
ened judicial scrutiny of their equal protection claims must show how
they are "like" racial groups (usually, people of color, especially
blacks) and other protected classes. 126 The comparative focus of
equal protection analysis is a product of a legal culture wedded to
precedent. Furthermore, comparative equal protection jurisprudence
may reflect ajudicial concern to remain true to the original purposes
of the Fourteenth Amendment-the eradication of racial subjuga-
125 Hutchinson, Ignoring the Sexualization of Rac supra note 10, at 10; see also Hutchin-
son, Out Yet Unseen, supra note 10, at 640 ("Multidimensionality exposes the various layers
of social power that inform heterosexism and homophobia. Multidimensional analysis also
reveals the multiple dimensions of social identity categories and offers a comprehensive
framework for conceptualizing sexual subordination that neither 'destroys' nor 'frag-
ments' our lives." (citation omitted)).
126 SeeYoshino, supra note 109, at 487 ("In considering arguments that other classifica-
tions be accorded heightened scrutiny, the courts have required claimants to demonstrate
the similarities these classifications share with race and sex.").
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tion-and to guard against a "slippery slope" or endless proliferation
of government classifications subject to exacting judicial scrutiny.127
Because the comparative approach often denies judicial solicitude to
historically oppressed groups, 128 it may in fact reflect the conservative
jurists' fear of "too much justice."1 29 Furthermore, while historical,
federalism, and separation of powers concerns may provide limited
justification for comparative and cautious equal protection analysis, 30
the reality of multidimensional subordination renders problematic
the strict comparative model courts typically apply in sexual orienta-
tion discrimination cases. For example, because racial subjugation,
heterosexism, and patriarchy are intertwined and mutually reinforc-
ing systems of subordination, an equality jurisprudence that seeks to
undo racial and gender hierarchies must also prevent the perpetua-
tion of. sexualized subordination. By failing to recognize the ways in
which racism, patriarchy, and homophobia interact to create subordi-
nation, courts and commentators deny the existence of gays and lesbi-
ans of color, construct gays and lesbians as white and people of color
as heterosexual, and erase the important differences within and
among oppressed social groups.' 3 ' In addition, while gay and lesbian
equal protection litigants labor to meet doctrinal requirements that
force them to show how they are like persons of color and other pro-
tected classes, the painful and complex reality of heterosexist subordi-
nation escapes judicial analysis. 132
127 See City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 445-46 (1985) (declining
to apply heightened scrutiny to equal protection claim of the "mentally retarded" because
it would be "difficult to find a principled way to distinguish a variety of other groups" such
as "the aging, the disabled, the mentally ill, and the infirm"); GERSTMANN, supra note 1, at
39 ("Conservative justices developed the three-tiered framework to beat back the then-
rapid expansion of the equal protection clause."); Yoshino, supra note 109, at 562-63
(describing gatekeeping role of suspect class doctrine).
128 See GERSrMANN, supra note 1, at 24 (observing that "the judicial window for recog-
nizing suspect and quasi-suspect classifications other than race and national ancestry was
quite brief" and noting that "[n]o new suspect or quasi-suspect classifications have been
found by the Court since 1977").
129 McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 339 (1987) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
130 Substantive due process analysis also utilizes a comparative approach: judges de-
bate whether rights at issue in contemporary cases are the same as or similar to historically
recognized rights. When the Court demands a rigid similarity, it invariably refuses to rec-
ognize new rights, but if its comparison is more relaxed, then it may find the right at issue
sufficiently related to an historically protected freedom. For a cogent explication of this
controversy, see Laurence H. Tribe & Michael C. Dorf, Levels of Generality in the Definition of
Rights, 57 U. CHI. L. REv. 1057 (1990).
131 This is particularly relevant in arguments concerning the "immutability" of the trait
around which the governmental classification revolves. See supra text accompanying notes
108-11.
132 See Hutchinson, Out Yet Unseen, supra note 10, at 633 (arguing that the "many
harms sexual subordination causes ... require legal and political remedies for their own
sake-without reference to the rights and injuries of black heterosexuals").
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Instead of requiring equal protection plaintiffs to prove that they
are identical to people of color (who themselves, given gender, class,
and sexuality differences, do not have a monolithic experience) to
receive civil rights protection, a better approach would examine why
racial subordination and other forms of oppression are undesirable
and injurious and why they therefore warrant statutory and constitu-
tional remedies. Racial subjugation creates arbitrary, explosive, and
violent divisions in society; it places unjustifiable limits on the cultural
and economic productivity of classes of individuals; and it causes eco-
nomic dislocation and emotional injuries. Accordingly, racial subju-
gation is necessarily inconsistent with notions of equality and fairness.
Focusing on these generalized harms rather than on whether cer-
tain classes of people are identical to or like persons of color (e.g.,
whether they possess an immutable trait that is the ground for dis-
crimination), provides a useful alternative framework to the inflexible
comparative approach to equal protection that has often justified de-
nying equal protection claims of historically oppressed groups. This
approach would also limit the categories of discrimination that receive
heightened judicial scrutiny, because not all forms of governmental
discrimination produce the harms, such as economic dislocation,
emotional indignities, and suppressed productivity, central to this al-
ternative approach. Furthermore, multidimensionality helps to reveal
these harms, particularly in the emergent and unsettled terrain of gay
and lesbian equality jurisprudence. For example, directing gay and
lesbian equality theory to the economic dimensions of heterosexism
and to the economic, racial, and gender diversity of gay and lesbian
people will highlight the political powerlessness of gays and lesbians
and discredit the notion that gays and lesbians are privileged and un-
deserving of civil rights protection. 33
3. Colorblindness, Contradictions, and the Indeterminacy of Rights
A multidimensional approach to the issue of heterosexism, which
unveils the racialized nature of anti-gay discourse, also uncovers the
myth of "colorblindness" and the limitations of a rights-based equality
analysis. In the last decade, the Rehnquist Court has become decid-
edly colorblind, at least in principle, holding that strict scrutiny
should apply to all governmental race classifications-remedial or in-
vidious, state or federal-and has required extensive and sophisti-
133 In a recent article, Kenji Yoshino argues that equal protection doctrine should fo-
cus on the "political powerlessness" strand of the heightened scrutiny test and retire others
such as immutability and visibility because they require groups to portray themselves as
being the same as blacks. See Yoshino, supra note 109 passim (focusing on generalized
harms).
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cated evidence to justify race-based affirmative action measures.'3 4
Nevertheless, equal protection analysis, as applied in lower courts and
by at least three sitting Justices of the Supreme Court, racializes gays
and lesbians: these Justices compare gays and lesbians to persons of
color and, finding fundamental "differences" between the two groups,
deny the former the protection of constitutional civil rights law. Ironi-
cally, the racializing special rights discourse is often invoked by mem-
bers of the court-Justices Scalia, Thomas, and Rehnquist-and by
political organizations that are among the most prominent and vehe-
ment opponents of remedial race consciousness. 135 Furthermore, the
same Justices who find substantial differences between gays and lesbi-
ans and persons of color, including the purported possession of polit-
ical power by the former, have not found sufficient differences
between persons of color and whites to disqualify the latter from re-
ceiving the most exacting judicial scrutiny of their "discrimination"
claims.' 3 6 Thus, whites, as a class, receive strict judicial scrutiny of
their equal protection claims, while gays and lesbians (and the poor
and the elderly) receive only rational basis.' 3 7 The contradictory rec-
ognition and nonrecognition of race and "political power" by the
Court's most openly conservative bloc are probably less a logical flaw
than a demonstration of the indeterminacy and limitations of a
"rights" approach to equality and the impact of judicial bias on equal
134 See, e.g., Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995) (applying strict
scrutiny to federal, race-based affirmative action programs); City of Richmond v. J.A.
Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989) (applying strict scrutiny to invalidate municipal, race-
based affirmative action program and rejecting as insufficient the city's stark evidence of
discrimination in need of remedy).
135 See Shaw v. Reno, 517 U.S. 899, 907 (1996) (Rehnquist, C.J., writing for the Court)
(arguing that "[r]acial classifications are antithetical to the Fourteenth Amendment" and
invalidating voting district designed to remedy prior discrimination against blacks);
Adarand, 515 U.S. at 239 (Scalia, J., concurring) ("In my view, government can never have
a 'compelling interest' in discriminating on the basis of race in order to 'make up' for past
racial discrimination in the opposite direction."); id. at 241 (Thomas, J., concurring) ("In
my mind, government-sponsored racial discrimination based on benign prejudice is just as
noxious as discrimination inspired by malicious prejudice." (footnote omitted)); Chideya,
supra note 85, at 73 (questioning sincerity of anti-gay organizations' use of race and over-
tures to black community given the opposition to racial antidiscrimination policies by lead-
ers of these organizations); Smith, supra note 85, at 128 (noting "irony" of "alliance"
between conservative anti-gay organizations and blacks given those organizations' "long
history of actively opposing [black] civil rights").
136 See arguments byjustices Rehnquist, Scalia, and Thomas discussed supra note 135.
137 See GERs'ANN, supra note 1, at 83. Professor Gerstmann explains:
In the context of affirmative action and in other cases, the courts have ap-
plied strict scrutiny to laws that discriminate against whites and maes. This
has produced the bizarre result that gays and lesbians are considered too
politically powerful to receive the benefit of strict scrutiny, but whites and
males are not.
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protection discourse. 138 By now, Justice Scalia has left little room for
doubt about his opinions of the legitimacy of civil rights protection
for gays and lesbians,1 39 but the inconsistency of his approaches to
color and power lends credibility to the indeterminacy thesis and the
postmodern view that legal doctrine is shaped by political, economic,
and social forces, rather than simply neutral abstraction. 140 Further-
more, it is unclear how most of the other members of the Court would
approach the question of heightened scrutiny for gays and lesbians, as
indeterminacy has marked their decisions regarding race and sexual-
ity as well. For instance, while the Court in Romer applied what many
scholars have characterized as "strong" rationality review to invalidate
Amendment 2 (without reaching the question whether sexuality classi-
fications warrant heightened scrutiny),141 the majority of the Court,
subscribing to its much-criticized "discriminatory intent rule," contin-
ues to apply a more deferential form of rational basis review to facially-
neutral governmental policies that adversely affect people of color
and women.1 4 2 These contradictions, which perpetuate gender and
racial hierarchies while granting limited protections to gays and lesbi-
ans, implicate an ongoing debate over the efficacy of rights discourse
as a vehicle for social equality.
Despite the indeterminacy and politicization of rights-based
equality doctrine, gay and lesbian theorists can learn from the experi-
ence of antiracist activists, particularly critical race theorists, who en-
courage progressive scholars to accept the "contradiction" of being
138 See, e.g., Marc A. Fajer, Can Two Real Men Eat Quiche Together? Storytelling Gender-Role
Stereotypes, and Legal Protection for Lesbians and Gay Men, 46 U. MLAMu L. Rxv. 511, 633-51
(1992) (arguing that negative social stereotypes influence the outcome of litigation involv-
ing questions of gay and lesbian equality); Mark Tushnet, An Essay on Rights, 62 TEx. L.
Rrzv. 1363, 1364-84 (1984) (critiquing rights as unstable, indeterminate, offering a false
reality, and as an impediment to progressive political forces). But see GEas mA, supra
note 1, at 84-89 (attributing disparities resulting from class-to-classification shift in equal
protection doctrine to "faulty analysis" in Supreme Court and "confusion" over this analysis
in lower courts).
139 See supra text accompanying notes 115-18 (discussing Justice Scalia's dissenting
opinion in Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 636-53 (1996)); see also Equality Found. of Greater
Cincinnati, Inc. v. City of Cincinnati, 518 U.S. 1001, 1001 (1996) (mem.) (Scalia, J., dis-
senting) ("Unelected heads of city departments and agencies, who are in other respects (as
democratic theory requires) subject to the control of the people, must, where special pro-
tection for homosexuals are [sic] concerned, be permitted to do what they please.").
140 See Crenshaw, supra note 57, at 1346 ("[T]hough they attempt to lay claim to an
apolitical perch from which to accuse civil rights visionaries of subverting the law to poli-
tics, the neoconservatives as well rely on their own political interpretations to give meaning
to their respective concepts of rights and oppression.").
141 SeeAshutosh Bhagwat, Purpose Scrutiny in ConstitutionalAnalysis, 85 C.L. L. REv. 297,
327 (1997) (including Romer on a list of cases representing "rational basis review with a
bite" (internal quotation marks omitted)).
142 See McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279 (1987); Personnel Adm'r v. Feeney, 442 U.S.
256 (1979); Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252
(1977); Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
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simultaneously skeptical of law as an instrument of social progress and
committed, nonetheless, to utilizing law and "right reason" to advo-
cate for oppressed social groups. 143 A multidimensional analysis, by
unveiling the racial, gender, and class elements of anti-gay and lesbian
discourse, can respond to the politicization and contradictions of
equal protection jurisprudence and articulate creative theories that
call upon courts to account for their "colorblind" yet racialized appli-
cation of equal protection analysis.
CONCLUSION
The work of Audre Lorde, the late black lesbian writer, contains
many important lessons for progressive theorists and activists. In an
influential essay, Lorde warns critical theorists and activists not to
reproduce the mechanics of oppression in their own work. Lorde has
a powerful, yet seemingly obvious, message: "the master's tools will never
dismantle the master's house."144 Contemporary gay, lesbian, bisexual,
and transgendered theorists and activists can benefit from Lorde's vi-
sion, for there exists a harmful congruence of pro-gay and anti-gay
discourses: both marginalize people of color and the poor and depict
a gay and lesbian community privileged by race and class. Gay and
lesbian essentialism, in addition to exacerbating the invisibility of the
poor and people of color and leading to theories that fail to challenge
their oppression, legitimizes a conservative racial discourse that seeks
to deny the protections of civil rights structures to all gay, lesbian,
bisexual, and transgendered people. This same discourse is invoked
by jurists in equal protection litigation to justify the denial ofjudicial
solicitude to gay and lesbian people. While heterosexism is a social
evil whether endured by wealthy or poor, whites or persons of color,
men, women, or transgendered people, it is imperative that pro-gay
forces reconstruct their theories to counter the inaccurate racialized
and classed depiction of gays and lesbians by homophobic forces.
Multidimensional analysis provides a needed alternative to the current
essentialism and conceptual narrowness of progressive sexual politics.
Multidimensionality examines the diverse effects of heterosexism
and other forms of oppression on personal identity and well-being. It
argues for the inclusion of sexual identity oppression within civil
rights law, not by "comparing" heterosexism with racial subjugation,
143 My thinking on this issue is informed by many sources, but most significantly by the
important work of Angela Harris. See Angela P. Harris, Foreword: TheJurisprudence of Recon-
struction, 82 CAL. L. REv. 741 (1994). For other compelling works on this subject, see Cren-
shaw, supra note 57, Mari J. Matsuda, Looking to the Bottom Critical Legal Studies and
Reparations, 22 HAv. C.R-C.L. L. REv. 323 (1987), and PatriciaJ. Williams, Alchemical Notes:
Reconstructing Ideals from Deconstructed Rights, 22 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 401 (1987).
144 AuDP, LORDE, The Master's Tools Will Never Dismantle the Master's House, in Slsim
OUTSIDER 110, 112 (1984).
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but by revealing the connections between the two modalities of op-
pression. With the recent growth of race critiques within queer theo-
ries, pro-gay activists now have the tools to redirect the negative path
of antidiscrmination discourse. The choices they make will determine
whether complex structures of oppression will be dismantled or
whether civil rights law will continue to deliver a partial justice,
grounded in racial, gender and class advantage and upon the silenc-
ing of women, the poor, and persons of color.
